Exceptionalism has been the principal narrative of the United States' foreign policy decision-making. It is the set of beliefs and principles that envisages the country's uniqueness and superiority over the rest. It has two strands: one being its status as an exemplar state; and the other being God's chosen people -the latter being the dominant one. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) threatened life, liberty, pursuit of happiness and freedom -far away from the shores of the US. However, with ‗doing God's work' underpinning its foreign policy dictates -the US mobilised its military forces and spearheaded the campaign to help its Middle Eastern allies in getting rid of ISIS. The article aims to understand the basic tenets of US exceptionalism and the intervening variables which led the country to fight against the ISIS.
Introduction
t would not be an overly ambitious claim to say that Woodrow Wilson's ‗calling for a cause' 1 shaped the United States' (US) foreign conduct in modern history, perhaps now more than it did in his own time. It has remained an epicentre of the country's foreign policy, where the entire roster of preceding presidents has formulated this policy on a more or less similar foundation. Prior to the actions taken against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the US had kept its distance from the issue of ISIS altogether due to the war-weary mood of Congress. However, a number of issues rose which compelled the US to push back against ISIS. The factors which compelled it to intervene have an interesting dynamism which correspondingly allows an insight into how this particular problem has been approached.
The essence of US exceptionalism is not about ‗uniqueness' or ‗difference', rather it is based on the belief that the path of history the country follows is different from the laws and norms that govern other countries. 2 The US is not merely bigger or powerful, rather an ‗exception' -a holder and preacher of freedom and liberty with moral superiority.
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This belief is the main ingredient of its cultural and intellectual framework and policies. 4 There are two consequentialist strands of exceptionalist thought that influence its foreign policy:
1. The US as an exemplar state -referred to as ‗Global Exceptionalism'. 2. The US as a missionary nation (often the more dominant strand) -referred to as ‗Messianic Exceptionalism.'
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Since independence, both strands have influenced the country's international relations. Running parallel to the demands of exceptionalism was the idea of ‗promotion of American values to the world':
Exceptionalist language is not only used in public explanation of policy, but also used by policymakers themselves behind closed doors…the belief in American exceptionalism, therefore, provides the framework for discourse in US foreign policymaking, even if it is rarely the main determining factor of policy itself. 6 As the article progresses, explanation of the exceptional element in US' foreign policy will be highlighted and how this element forced outcomes against the ISIS contrary to the will of the executors of the foreign policy. Policymakers are the primary translators and responders to the forces prevailing in the international system who shape their decisions 3 -George W. Bush: Inaugural Address‖ (speech, Washington, D.C., January 20, 2005), CBS News, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/george-w-bush-inaugural-address-2005/. President Bush calling the US a beacon of light in the dark world. 4 
Exceptionalism in US Foreign Policy: Its Roots
Foreign policy pertains to minor and major adjustments in the wake of changes in the global political landscape. More so, it is an adjustment (in terms of needs and means) to the trends of international politics. Assessment, on the part of statesmen, of available resources defined as ‗national interest' in fulfilling set goals in due course is the essence of foreign policy. Different objectives require different techniques. Ignoring core interests or overlap between core and non-core interests can cause ambiguity and lead to imbalance between the means and ends.
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In the post-Second World War international order, US foreign policy conduct overshadowed global politics which were assessed by US statesmen in accordance with their intellectual history and under the influence of the country's so-assumed ‗exceptional character', values of freedom, liberty and rule of law, constitutionalism, capitalism and right of self-determination. 9 These values have, in one way or another, remained at the centre of US foreign policy, effectively giving birth to the concept of ‗Exceptionalism', and shaping its entire history as a nation -restraining its leaders, from foreign entanglement as a ‗role model' on the one hand; and pushing them in international politics as a ‗beacon of light to lead' on the other. 10 Method instead of substance shaped the country's involvement in world affairs.
11 Historically, this meant advocating the ‗fulfilment of our manifest destiny to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions.' 12 Consequently, this premise became the cornerstone to defend and justify the annexation of Texas, Oregon from the British, and war with Mexico in 1846-48. 13 Ostensibly, Sullivan's use of the word ‗Providence' highlights this ‗exceptionalism' as being deeply religious. Mountjoy highlighted three main aspects of ‗Manifest Destiny': …the special virtues of the American people and their institutions; their mission to redeem and remake the world in the image of America; and the American destiny under God to accomplish this sublime task. 14 According to Stuart, ‗Manifest Destiny implied not simply territorial growth, but sanctified ideology and institutions.' 15 Noble, while shedding light on this religious strand, cited Charles and Mary Beard who regarded Jefferson as the ‗greatest political saint' since he believed the ‗American nation to be a society of people speaking a common language, knit together by ties of blood.' 16 Similarly, McCrisken also saw the religious factor as the second, yet more dominant version of US exceptionalism. 17 He cited Albert Weinberg who defined ‗Manifest Destiny' as ‗the doctrine that one nation has a preeminent social worth, a distinctively lofty mission, and consequently, unique rights in the application of moral principles.' 18 McCrisken maintained that this idea was so strong and appealing that it overshadowed and instituted itself as the ‗national creed.'
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The intention behind this was to present a model based loosely on the US' values providing a ‗customisable outline' for the international order. Since then, policymakers have attached ‗Woodrow Wilson's calling for a cause' in their international conduct. For neoclassical realists, both internal and external factors are an important part of foreign policy conduct. However, this article argues that domestic factors have remained an integral part of US foreign policy initiatives, i.e., the ‗exceptional character' rooted in the distinct structure of the country's political ethos. This political culture and national identity was the intellectual creativity of its forefathers, who centred this value system against European norms of colour, creed, race and religion at the time. 20 Since then, this character of unity has shaped the country's conduct, and compromising it openly has remained a question mark for the practitioners of US foreign policy.
The idea that the US can perceive itself or indeed any of its actions throughout the course of history as ‗exceptional' has a broad link with its political philosophy. Culturally, Americans believe that their political struggle, Constitution and institutional setup are a unique experiment in governance. In contemporary world politics, perhaps no other state has such a belief sown into its ideals. Thus, the US, in issues (such as the activities of ISIS) finds that it has an ‗obligation' to promote its ‗values' in the world, as these are universal values, albeit in dearth.
How this obligation is perceived is relative. According to Holsti, the US ‗being the leader, for the promotion of American values, sometimes … transgresses the international norms'.
21 Some see it as bearing the characteristics of a potent ‗Social Contract' in the political setup, and profoundly honourable in affecting its ‗perception processes', whilst defining crises and articulating adequate responses. According to others, American exceptionalism, flanked by the legacy of its forefathers and the belief of being more value-oriented instead of system-oriented, has dominated the country's response mechanism based upon ‗exceptionalist perceptions'.
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Martin Lipset defines these as egalitarianism, individualism, populism and laissez-faire. 23 Nevertheless, fighting for a cause and searching for an element which would justify US commitment remains the modus operandi of its interventionist foreign policy. For example, ISIS represented an opportunity to atone for the stigma of Iraq, while re-establishing a sense of moral justification for its presence in the Middle East. President Barack Obama reiterated motives of the US engagement as: 21 Holsti, -Exceptionalism in American Foreign Policy: Is it Exceptional?‖ 382-384. Being an ‗exceptionalist state' entails: a) responsibility rather an obligation; b) international norms that govern the conduct of ordinary states are not applicable because its cause craves global responsibility; c) an instinctive element of observing a hostile world against its values; d) external enemies are uniquely necessary for its institutional structure; e) an element of innocence forms part of the character of the state, which streamlines hatred of the world against its unique values. 22 These perceptions serve as the basis for Exceptionalism since US policymakers are deeply motivated and driven by their belief in doing God's work. 23 Western liberal-democratic societies exist on the principle of dual relation i.e., their ‗social contract' is consensual and free from any coercion. Consequently, foreign policy behaviour is deeply dependent on the second party of the contract and is the main motivational factor, which means that public opinion is key in the making of foreign policy. 25 Widmaier shows how self-created rhetoric sometimes constrains foreign policy choices of presidents. 26 Ideas that are radical or even a subtle deviation from that contractual political setup of the US enter the territory identified as inhumane at best and downright barbaric at worst; in particular, if that involves violation of human rights and liberties similar to what was exercised and exhibited by ISIS. Perhaps, this exceptional belief and character was best described by President Wilson:
We do not confine our enthusiasm for individual liberty and free national development to the incidents and movements of affairs which affect only ourselves. We feel it wherever there is a people that tries to walk in these difficult paths of independence and rights. 27 Atrocities committed against the fundamentals of US exceptionalism, hence, bind the country to act, react and mobilise, while, launching a crusade -to do God's work -hence, becoming a recurring 24 element in foreign policy conduct. 28 Resultantly, approaches to issues that threaten its exceptionalism would be stiff, spontaneous and backed by the nation. 29 Neoclassical realists would argue that decision-makers can coax national tendencies in order to back their policy endeavours. Foreign policy, in relation is dependent on these decision-makers having acute knowledge of what the general mood of the public is. As far as ISIS is concerned, constant intervening played a large part in the formulation of policy. The war-weary US was not in mood to intervene militarily. National tendencies and moods need to be examined against systemic constraints, conformity in such cases leads to foreign policy acts backed by the national mood, financed by national resources and guided by stoic leadership. The story of the ISIS presents consideration of the forces regarded important in foreign policy decision-making.
From the US vantage point, Syria represents the epicentre of all its misery in the Middle East -namely the formation of a troika country's key strategic goal, not for itself, at least not primarily, but more for the appeasement of its Middle Eastern allies. Syria's al-Assad, being backed by Iran serves the latter's geopolitical with Iran and Hezbollah, culminating in ‗the Shia Axis'. 30 Weakening this axis remains the purpose of assisting Hezbollah in Lebanon against Israel, as well as strengthening its position against Saudi Arabia and other Sunni states in the region. The US approached the crises in terms of drive for democracy, which, however, proved complicated because of the regional and international actors involved: Naji advocated strategies of disruption, exhaustion, management of savagery and empowerment; 37 while al-Suri advocated ‗leaderless resistance'. Naji's influence was focused on territorial acquisition used in a two-fold way: to manage savagery and lay the foundation of a neocaliphate; and threaten the economic health of the enemy and demoralise its population. Al-Suri's influence inspired Zarqawi's independent operation and reluctance in showing allegiance to al-Qaeda's leadership. The death of Zarqawi on June 7, 2006 38 changed the nature of the then alQaeda in Iraq (AQI). 39 Influenced by the strategy of ‗Decapitation', his carcass was turned into a display as a symbol of repercussion in the face of US retaliation. However, this backfired and al-Zarqawi was extolled for his efforts, and the leadership of al-Qaeda paid tribute to his martyrdom with Ayman al-Zawahiri calling for AQI to establish an Islamic State (IS).
It took only a few months for the Mujahideen Shura Council to announce the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), under the leadership of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. 40 The successor of Zarqawi's AQI Abu Hamza al-Muhajir pledged loyalty to the newly formed IS. The group remained loyal to al-Qaeda and transitorily operated according to Zawahiri's advice. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took over ISI in the aftermath of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi's death in 2010. This marked the turning point in the course of ISI. 41 He re-organised ISIS by taking advantage of the To strengthen the acquired statehood and to formulate a statestructure, a caliphate was established headed by a caliph with its provinces (wilayat) headed by governors, assisted by local governments and administrative units with powerful ground strength, aggressive media strategy and complex economy. The so-called ‗caliphate' generated its revenue from the local populations via taxes and oil smuggling. 46 The organisation considers the traditional ways of financing terrorism less useful and injected itself in the black market and smuggling routes. It also 42 48 However, for the Salafists, it was their dealing with the Yazidis which highlighted their true colour. One particular episode transformed ISIS from an insurgent movement addressing the sympathies of the Sunni tribes, providing a platform to senior Iraqi military personnel and cashing in on the pro-Iranian approach of al-Maliki to the brutal terrorist outfit today. If al-Qaeda and other outlets are adhering to Salafism, ISIS alongside Salafism, are motivated by the ideology of Takfir. It was this ideological orientation that was threatening not only for the rest of the world, but also organisations like al-Qaeda. 49 Under this influence, ISIS declared Yazidis as worshipers of the devil. This declaration legitimised killing their men and enslavement of their women and children, threatening a ‗humanitarian crises'. 50 Members of the Yazidis who managed to take flee escaped to Mount Sinjar and lived there without food and water. 51 The organisation which former US President Barack Obama once called the ‗jayvee squad', 52 compared to al-Qaeda of bin Laden, took over territories, claimed caliphate, declared war on the Middle East and threatened humanity at large. Suddenly, the jayvee squad became the ‗American problem'. 53 Against the background of video channelling, the UN declared ‗threatened genocide' could not go unnoticed. 54 This was a calling for the US -the self-professed champion of humanitarian cause and international law. 55 The US opted for airstrikes together with Iraqi counterparts. The ground troops constituted of Peshmerga, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), its Syrian offshoot -the Peoples' Protection Unit (YPG), and the Yazidis. However, the US could not circumvent its involvement against the mounting pressure ‗to do more about ISIS'. President Obama declared:
Our objective is clear: We will degrade, and ultimately destroy the ISIL through a comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy. 56 This clarity of mission attracted more partners into the coalitionthe United Kingdom, France, Germany, Australia, Canada and the Netherlands, alongwith Sunni-majority countries -Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar, Turkey and United Arab Emirates (UAE). 57 The mantle of leadership fell upon the shoulders of the US, a recurring feature since the days of the Cold War. The glue that held the members of the coalition together was the ‗atrocities of the ISIS' and a ‗threatened genocide' i.e., the humanitarian cause.
The US, along with its coalition partners, began airstrikes against ISIS targets on September 23, 2014. 58 In the White House press releases since authorisation of the airstrikes, a frequent referral to the ‗humanitarian cause' is noted, along with the notion that the war is now being fought in the name of ‗American values':
Our comprehensive strategy against ISIL is harnessing all elements of American power, across our governmentmilitary, intelligence, diplomatic, economic, development and perhaps most importantly, the power of our values...
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Why Act Now?
Against the milieu of the Iraqi invasion of 2003, the Obama Administration could not immediately venture into Syria's Civil War, even at the expense of its allies in the Middle East. At the same time, the US could not keep itself aloof of the ‗atrocities of the ISIS'. American foreign policy, thus, kept its ‗moral cause' intact while approaching ISIS. History teaches via analogy. 60 The experience of the Taliban government in Afghanistan in the last decade of 20 th Century shaped the experience of the US regarding ultra-orthodox governments. Given its national security, the US could not allow such an organisation with an agenda of establishing ‗Caliphate' to establish itself in a region of vital importance like the Middle East.
Foreign policy is the sum of national historical experiences. 61 World events and human rights violations shape tactical adjustments in policy options; and the IS provided the latter to the US. 62 Systemic forces required the US to act against the possible threat, while violation of human rights challenged the exceptional character of the US' domestic structure. The emergence of ISIS was a threat to the government of Iraq. The strategically significant areas of Syria and Iraq in the control of an extremist group could pose a security challenge to the US itself for which 9/11 is not a distant memory. It could also pose a threat to the stability established at the Israeli front and the international trade schemes operating through the region. Furthermore, accessibility to the Mediterranean Sea could make it a potential challenge as a terrorist entrée to international waters.
ISIS' pre-eminence is a corollary of the power vacuum created after the 2003 Iraq invasion. ‗Replacement of authority' does not necessarily conform to the objective of American values -‗replacing hatred and resentment with democracy and hope' is necessary. 63 Invade, overthrow, install and rollback -a Machiavellian scheme -does not serve US exceptionalism, 64 which lies in restructuring society along its values. Organisations like ISIS exploit the weaknesses of provisional governments and get the backing of other actors whose interests are at stake. The superseded faction tries to regain control which increases the chances of conflicts. History replicates this phenomenon time and time again. Foreign policy, under the influence of an ideology, requires tactful assessment on the part of its practitioners. The social makeup of the state, alongwith the regional political configuration, needs to be kept in mind. Lessons of history need to be remembered -prolonged wars are not good for a nation. 65 Thus, taking the country back to war in a region from where it completed its withdrawal three years earlier would go against the principles of pragmatism. Accordingly, the policy of ‗air-raids' was adopted, against the backdrop of a statesman who came to office on his anti-war stance and the fear of elongation of an already complex issue. 66 To an organisation, seeking an order based on (religious) purity 67 contrary to internationally agreed legitimate concepts of international community, atrocities are the tools of operation.
Tackling organisations like these requires an all-comprehensive strategy. Wiping out safe havens and targeting its leadership would not eliminate ISIS -cut off one head, two more would grow. Involvement in the region, integrating various factions, harmonising interests of key actors in the region and an ensured US backing could possibly dry down the extremist surge fuelling the ranks of ISIS. 
Conclusion
The article covered three different yet interrelated issues i.e., US exceptionalism, its role in the country's foreign policy conduct, and, most importantly, its articulation in relation to ISIS. The theoretical part explained the nature of international system and state and described the attitude of foreign policy decision-makers. The authors briefly demonstrated how the US applies exceptionalism in its foreign policy, how an issue or crises is translated into a national security threat and how US foreign policy practitioners find its solution in their value system. ISIS lost its capital and centre of gravity due to the US-led military strikes under the influence of exceptionalism; 70 while the outfit has become weak, the logic behind drawing the ‗calling for a cause' to fight against it has established a moral obligation for the US' foreign policy decisionmakers to destroy its splinter cells and prevent its future rise. President Trump's military actions against al-Assad in response to the latter's use of chemical weapons were guided by US exceptionalismhis belief in the country's uniqueness articulated in his ‗America First' policy. The Iraq invasion tore apart the 9/11 national consensus in the US. Under the slogan of change, Barack Obama campaigned against the Iraq war and pulled out US forces in 2011. 71 However, an invader often fails to anticipate post-war scenarios. Failure to anticipate this resulted in the emergence of ‗al-Qaeda in Iraq' eventually declaring itself the Islamic State. Exploiting the weaknesses of the transitional authorities and Machiavellian strategies of the coalition partners, ISIS expanded its influence in Iraq and Syria. Influenced by the Salafist/Takfiri ideologies, the organisation took its ‗management of savagery' to a different level. It established a pseudo-state, with a strict interpretation of Shariah (Islamic law), a relatively working economy, a system of civil institutions and banks based on violence as a tool of governance. Declarations against the Yazidis was a fierce decision which spurred a flurry of action in the international community against it 72 since the international community and the UN feared a threatened genocide. Had the US opted for deterrence and containment of ISIS earlier, the domino effect of ISIS might not have happened -especially in Syria whose city Raqqa acted as its capital. During the Obama administration, US Congress did not back action against ISIS. Consequently, according to Henry Kissinger, events can occur whose consequences -such as genocide -are so horrendous that they tilt the scale towards intervention beyond considerations of strategy. 73 At the same time, the US propagated the removal of Assad at the international level. This strategy was viewed in strategic terms, which was criticised by China and Russia. Domestically, against the background of the Iraq and Afghan war, the American public was not supportive of the endeavour. Had the involvement against Syria been a strategic or political choice, the US would have taken its allies into confidence -especially Saudi Arabia. Had Russia remained at the centre of US foreign policy, the latter would have deployed its troops on the ground. It might even have acted against the Kremlin in Georgia in 2008 at the outbreak of the South Ossetia War and against the annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014. But the country's involvement against ISIS represents the moralistic elements in its foreign policy. ISIS, while pursuing the strategies outlined by Naji, 74 and Al Suri 75 -was a terrorist organisation involved in killing of non-combatants, propagating an ideology that was hostile to religious freedom and pluralism, supporting a form of government that required utmost obedience, posed a threat to ‗American values'. Thus, the US acted.
